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Sovereign lending markets are not working well. The current non-system for sover-
eign debt restructuring remains fraught with perverse incentives, which in turn lead 
to destructive and inequitable outcomes. 
The United Nations General Assembly approved in September 2015 nine principles 
that should guide sovereign debt restructuring processes.
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1. Introduction*
The ultimate goal of sovereign debt restructuring is to 
restore the sustainability of public debt with high proba-
bility.1 But this is not happening. Since 1970, more than 
half of the restructuring episodes with private creditors 
were followed by another restructuring or default with-
in five years2 — evidence inconsistent with any sensible 
definition of »restoration of sustainability of public debt 
with a high probability.« This evidence suggests that re-
lief for distressed debtors is often insufficient for achiev-
ing the main goal of a restructuring, delaying the recov-
ery from recessions or depressions, with large negative 
social consequences.3 
The lack of a statutory regime for dealing with distressed 
sovereign debt makes sovereign debt crises resolution a 
complex process — marked by inefficiencies and inequi-
ties that take multiple forms.4 The current non-system is 
characterized by bargaining based on decentralized and 
non-binding market-based instruments centered on col-
lective action clauses and competing codes of conduct. 
The IMF often plays the role of the facilitator in this pro-
cess of bargaining between a distressed debtor and its 
creditors.5 But it has not always been successful in en-
suring that restructuring needs are addressed in a timely 
way — indeed, it has often failed; and as we have already 
noted, even when restructuring processes have ultimately 
been carried out, they have often not been deep enough.6 
* The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Institute 
for New Economic Thinking (INET) for the research program on sovereign 
debt they are leading at Columbia University as part of an INET grant for 
studies on Macroeconomic Efficiency and Stability.
1. Public debt is sustainable with high probability when in most of the 
possible economic scenarios its repayment does not require a sequence of 
future borrowings that is unbounded. A sustainable debt path may entail 
some probability of default (i. e. the debt could only be sustained with un-
bounded borrowing), reflected, of course, in an interest rate that is higher 
than the safe rate of return. If there is a very high rate of interest, it would 
normally reflect that, in the judgment of the market, there is a significant 
probability of default. On the other hand, an outside expert group might 
conclude that there is a high probability of default even if the market risk 
premium is small; markets are sometimes »irrationally exuberant«.
2. See Guzman (2016a), Guzman and Stiglitz (2016b).
3. In the presence of cross-border spillovers, the delay is also costly for 
the countries that have economic relations with the distressed debtor. 
See Orszag and Stiglitz (2002).
4. Economic theory shows that, in the presence of macroeconomic ex-
ternalities, markets will not resolve restructuring processes efficiently. See 
Miller and Stiglitz (1999, 2010).
5. The bargaining process is itself an indication of the absence of perfect 
competition. Especially when there is bargaining with imperfect and asym-
metric information, both the outcomes and the process may be inefficient.
6. The IMF Independent Evaluation Office has pointed out serious flaws 
in the IMF role in the European crisis (IEO of IMF, 2016). The IMF fore-
Overall, the current non-system does not respect priority 
agreements or resolve inter-creditor inequities, address 
debtor-in-possession financing, or address adequately 
such ex-ante concerns as ensuring that creditors have 
sufficient incentives to lend under the right terms, or bor-
rowers have sufficient incentives for prudential behavior.7 
The gaps in the legal architecture create perverse incen-
tives for legal arbitrage and work against cooperation. 
These gaps have led to the emergence and growth of 
so-called vulture funds, hedge funds whose business 
model is based on exploiting the deficiencies in the rule 
of law that they helped shape.8 They specialize in at-
tacking countries in debt crises. The modus operandi 
consist in first buying distressed debt at bargain prices 
in secondary markets, generally issued under New York 
law, and then suing the issuer claiming full payment — 
full principal and full interest, including punitive inter-
est9 and compensation for risks that they did not take. 
Once they get a favorable ruling, if the country refus-
es to pay according to the ruling’s terms, they employ 
tough tactics.10 This kind of behavior has been on the 
increase over the past decade: While in the 1980s only 
about 5 per cent of debt restructurings were accompa-
nied by legal disputes, this figure increased to almost 
50 per cent in 2010 (see Schumacher, Trebesch, and 
Enderlein, 2014).
casts of countries in distress are often flawed, overestimating the speed 
of recoveries of countries in recessions (Guzman and Heymann, 2015), 
despite the fact that the non-linearities of fiscal multipliers recognized 
by the literature (Auerbach and Gorodnichencko, 2012; Blanchard and 
Leigh, 2013) are indications that the programs of fiscal adjustment 
should be expected to pose difficulties for recovery.
7. See Guzman and Stiglitz (2016a) for a more extensive analysis.
8. A prime example is the elimination of the defense of champerty for 
debt purchases or assignments of a value exceeding 500,000 US dollars 
by the New York state legislature in 2004. Previously, champerty prohib-
ited purchasing debt in default with the intention of suing the issuer (see 
Blackman and Mukhi, 2010).
9. Under New York law, the pre-judgment interest rate is 9 per cent. It 
was fixed in 1981, when the annual inflation rate in the US was 8.9 per 
cent, and it has not been modified since despite the significant fall in 
inflation. Such an interest rate on pre-judgment claims is more punitive 
than compensatory. Besides, vulture funds that buy defaulted debt may 
receive interest payments at this rate before there is a sentence even for 
periods between the default and the purchasing date, a period of time 
during which they did not hold the bonds. This is what happened in the 
dispute between Argentina and the vulture funds following the default 
of 2001 (see Cruces and Samples, 2016; Guzman, 2016b).
10. In the dispute with Argentina that followed the default of 2001, for 
instance, they managed to seize an iconic ship belonging to the country, 
they attempted unsuccessfully to seize deposits of the Central Bank of 
Argentina in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, they funded a va-
riety of advertisements intended to put pressure on Argentina’s govern-
ment to satisfy their demands, and they even supported the creation of 
a lobbying taskforce (American Task Force Argentina) that hired former 
high-profile government officials as lobbyists.
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Outcomes are alarming. The vultures’ strategies are bring-
ing exorbitant returns that result in severe inter-creditor 
inequities, which in turn aggravate a moral hazard prob-
lem that threatens the possibility of finalizing a process 
of sovereign debt restructuring — as it happened in the 
recent case of Argentina, for instance. In light of recent 
events good faith creditors are learning that holdout 
behavior pays off. In Argentina’s recent saga with the 
vulture funds in the US courts (where the vultures were 
led by NML Capital, a subsidiary of the New York based 
hedge fund Elliott Management), it wasn’t even neces-
sary to be a litigant in order to receive the same treatment 
the courts awarded to the vultures: the courts ordered 
the country to treat non-litigant holdout creditors in 
the same terms obtained by litigant vulture funds. Why, 
therefore, would good faith creditors be willing to coop-
erate on a restructuring process with a distressed debtor, 
which would probably include a large discount, if they 
could simply follow the lead of a vulture fund and get re-
turns that could be in the order of hundreds or even thou-
sands per cent higher? The main problem with the aggre-
gation of these individually »rational« actions is that, if a 
sufficiently large number of bondholders follow the same 
strategy, debt restructuring would become impossible to 
finalize. The case of Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital 
intensified an already long-running debate over the need 
for systemic reforms that involved academics, practition-
ers, multinational institutions, and civil society.11 
On the one hand, the International Capital Market Asso-
ciation (ICMA), with the support and endorsement of the 
IMF, suggested reforms to the sovereign debt contrac-
tual language in order to prevent situations like the one 
Argentina experienced with the vultures. The suggested 
new terms include a formula for aggregating collective 
action clauses (see ICMA, 2014; IMF, 2016; Gelpern, Hel-
ler, and Setser, 2016). Some countries are already issuing 
debt using this new language. Although the new terms 
are a sign of progress, they are unlikely to be sufficient to 
resolve fundamental problems currently faced in restruc-
turing processes (see Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a).
On the other hand, the United Nations took the lead 
in the efforts that aim to create a statutory mechanism 
11. The Report of the International Commission of Experts of the In-
ternational Monetary and Financial System appointed by the president 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations had pointed out that 
the approaches to sovereign debt restructuring were flawed, and that 
improvement was urgently needed to avoid further efficiency losses and 
inequitable results (Stiglitz et al., 2010).
for sovereign debt restructuring, as first reflected in the 
UN GA Resolution 68/304 passed in September 2014 
and later in UN GA Resolution 69/319 passed in Septem-
ber 2015. The latter resolution approved a set of nine 
principles that should serve as the basis for restructuring 
processes — sovereignty, good faith, transparency, im-
partiality, equitable treatment of creditors, sovereign im-
munity, legitimacy, sustainability, and majority restruc-
turing (henceforth the »UN Principles«).
The UN has laid out steps in the right direction. Although 
in the short term the creation of a multinational statuto-
ry framework for debt crises resolution does not seem to 
be feasible, the UN principles provide a valuable basis for 
the next stages of the process. This article analyzes the 
usefulness of those principles. Section 2 discusses how 
the principles could help in improving the resolution of 
sovereign debt crises. Section 3 explores a possible way 
forward along the lines of an incremental approach.
2. The Usefulness of the UN Principles
Of the 176 Member States that voted on UN GA Resolu-
tion 68/304 of September 2014, 124 voted in favor, 41 
abstained, and 11 voted against. The group of countries 
that abstained or voted against the resolution included 
mostly advanced economies. A year later, of the 183 
countries that voted on UN GA Resolution 69/319 adopt-
ing the UN principles, 136 countries voted in favor, 41 
abstained, and only 6 countries voted against. The latter 
group included the US and the UK, the two major juris-
dictions for sovereign debt issuances by emerging econ-
omies, as well as Canada, Germany, Israel, and Japan.
The UN principles have not been respected in many of 
the recent restructurings.12 Respect for them would re-
solve most of the deficiencies observed in recent restruc-
turing processes.
Sovereignty
The principle of sovereignty recognizes that the sover-
eign must have the right to decide its policies consistent 
with the objectives of the State, including the right to re-
structure its debt. Violating the right of a sovereign to 
12. See the Appendix for the full text of the UN principles.
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initiate a restructuring process obviously may result in the 
maintenance of debt levels that are not sustainable — but 
denies the sovereign any clear path out of the unsustain-
able debt. The result is that the economic situation of the 
distressed country is aggravated. Argentina’s case is again 
illustrative of these tensions: Had Argentina’s creditors re-
alized the disadvantageous outcome (relative to the vul-
tures) implied by the recent US Court Decision, they might 
not have settled and the country would have not recov-
ered.13 Argentina would have been in limbo, neither being 
able to repay nor to restructure its debts without inflicting 
unconscionable pain on its citizens — and even with such 
pain, repaying on its debt would not have been possible.14 
Good Faith
The principle of good faith imposes a duty on the sover-
eign debtor and its creditors to negotiate when the sover-
eign’s debt position becomes unsustainable. It states that 
negotiations in good faith must aim to reestablish debt 
sustainability. The literature offers guidance for determin-
ing the practical meaning of this principle for creditors: 
It entails a duty to participate in debt workout negotia-
tions, a duty to stipulate equitable restructuring terms, a 
duty not to jeopardize the outcome of good faith nego-
tiations by a negative vote, and a moratorium on holdout 
litigation seeking to extract preferential treatment (Gold-
mann, 2016). The principle also entails the protection of 
legitimate expectations, the prohibition of the abuse of 
rights, and the prevention of unjustified advantage from 
unlawful acts (Kolb, 2006).15 The anti-vulture legislation 
adopted by Belgium in 2015 provides practical guidance 
for codifying some aspects of this principle: Holdout be-
13. The remarkable recovery in the end created the resources to pay large 
returns on GDP indexed bonds to the exchange bondholders, which led 
to an ex-post haircut significantly lower than the initial haircut.
14. Similarly, Greece was in effect forced in 2015 to sign on to an agree-
ment entailing a further dose of austerity — which exacerbated its al-
ready deep depression — without any clear path to debt restructuring. 
Germany insisted that there be no debt restructuring, though Greece’s 
public debt was considered to be unsustainable with high probability by 
almost every analyst, including the IMF. See Varoufakis (2016). 
15. While, for economists, some of these terms are fraught with ambigui-
ties, the terms must come to take on relatively well-defined meanings as the 
principle is applied. It should be obvious that the demands of the vultures 
were inconsistent with many of these principles. For instance, while NML 
Capital could have claimed that, in Argentina’s case, it was legitimate to ex-
pect to be paid in full, since that had happened on other occasions (as in the 
case of Elliott Associates’ victory over Peru in 1998), a well-defined meaning 
of the concept could entail that the expectation of receiving full payment 
on a risky promise that has already been broken (as is the case with a de-
faulted bond), and when the market price of the bond reflects a very low 
probability of full repayment, is unreasonable and therefore illegitimate.
havior could be classified as abusive when the debt was 
acquired in default or at price reflecting a large differ-
ence between the nominal and the market price, and the 
bondholders’ claim payments are disproportionate with 
respect to what could be reasonably expected at the time 
of purchase, as reflected in market prices and the state of 
the sovereign debtor’s economy.
There are other aspects of good faith: creditors who pur-
chase instruments that include a compensation for risk 
cannot in good faith bargain to receive treatment as if 
the lending were risk-free. They should accept that off-
setting the high returns when things go well are the low 
returns when they do not (cf. Goldman, 2016; Guzman 
and Stiglitz, 2016a).
The principle must also be codified for the debtor side. 
A debtor acting in good faith in a restructuring process 
should negotiate with the goal of achieving a level of 
debt relief that ensures the recovery of sustainability 
with high probability, but no more.16 However, such a 
level of relief is hard to calculate, because it depends on 
assumptions about how the debtor’s economic perfor-
mance will depend on the terms of the restructuring, 
as well as about how it will depend on other relevant 
factors. In this sense, good faith requires transparency, 
as it should be clear for the stakeholders involved what 
are the underlying assumptions that lead to the com-
putation of a specific level of debt relief that ensures 
the recovery of sustainability with high probability, thus 
making the debtor’s negotiating stance consistent with 
the principle of good faith.
Argentina’s case again illustrates how the domestic 
courts’ lack of understanding of sovereign debt restruc-
turing processes may lead to confusions concerning the 
meaning of this principle, which in turn can harm the 
ultimate goals of a restructuring process. In Argentina’s 
dispute with the vulture funds, the Second Circuit de-
fined the country as a »uniquely recalcitrant« debtor,17 
that is, a debtor that didn’t act in good faith. But the 
Court did not cite any element to prove that the restruc-
turing terms proposed by Argentina in the exchanges of 
16. For instance, a debt relief of 100 per cent would obviously recover 
debt sustainability, but such a write-down would be larger than what 
distressed sovereigns need to recover sustainability with high probability.
17. See the Second Circuit Decision of August 23, 2013, www.shear-
man.com/~/media/Files/Services/Argentine-Sovereign-Debt/2013/Arg33_
NML_Second_Circuit_Decision.pdf, page 23 (last accessed on 22 Sep-
tember 2016).
M. GUZMAN & J. E. STIGLITZ  |  A SOFT LAW MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
6
2005 and 2010 were abusive, in the sense of aiming at 
a level of debt relief larger than what would restore sus-
tainability with high probability.18 Even in the absence of 
a multinational formal framework for sovereign debt re-
structuring, a proper codification of this principle could 
also provide guidance to domestic courts.
Transparency
The principle of transparency is also frequently violat-
ed. Sovereign credit default swaps (SCDS) can give rise 
to perverse incentives for those at the negotiating table 
who hold them, since they may benefit from non-co-
operative behavior that leads to a default. Transparent 
negotiations require disclosure of any potential conflict 
of incentives that could undermine the outcome of a re-
structuring process — and this necessitates disclosure of 
CDS positions. The opaqueness of SCDS markets makes it 
impossible to know what the incentives of the bargaining 
parties are in a restructuring process. And non-aligned 
incentives in this context could lead to inefficient delays. 
Clearly, bargaining in good faith requires transparency.
SCDS markets have experienced large growth over the 
past decades. The drafting and interpretation of SCDS 
contracts are the responsibility of the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Remarkably, those 
sitting in judgment on the interpretation of a particular 
contract evidently can do so even when they and/or their 
firms may be conflicted. Despite the multiple potential 
conflicts of incentives associated with SCDSs that can 
undermine restructuring process, these contracts receive 
certain preferential treatment under securities and com-
modities regulations and bankruptcy law. ISDA has man-
aged to secure exemptions and preferential treatment 
through its influence on domestic legislation (see Part-
noy, 2002, and Gelpern and Gulati, 2012, for an extend-
ed discussion). The principle of transparency also requires 
the disclosure of restructuring terms applicable to all ex-
ternal and domestic creditor groups (Gelpern, 2016).
18. A common mistake is to evaluate good faith based on a comparison 
between the level of relief pursued by the distressed debtor and the debt 
write-downs of other restructuring experiences. But such a criterion is 
flawed if the situation of the country differs from the sample it is be-
ing compared to, or if the sample of other experiences includes a large 
fraction of episodes where the restructuring process was not effective 
to restore debt sustainability. Implementing this criterion can create an 
unintended inertia: the norm that gets established perpetuates itself, no 
matter how unreasonable. The right comparison for assessing good faith 
is between the level of relief that the distressed country pursues and the 
level of relief that would restore sustainability with high probability.
Impartiality
The principle of impartiality restricts the set of institu-
tions that could host a mechanism for sovereign debt re-
structuring. Institutions that have a biased representation 
of the stakeholders involved or are creditors themselves 
are not suitable hosts for such a mechanism. Judge Grie-
sa’s rulings in favor of the vulture funds in Republic of Ar-
gentina v. NML Capital violate the principle of equitable 
treatment of creditors. The case involved a situation in 
which good faith creditors received a discount of about 
two thirds (see Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), while the 
vulture fund NML Capital that paid on average 28 cents 
on the dollar over its declared purchases (done when 
the country was in a situation of distress, either a few 
months before the default or after the default, or even 
after the country had reached a restructuring agreement 
with 76.15 per cent of the creditors) got returns of ap-
proximately 1,270 per cent (see Guzman, 2016b).19 
It is worth noting that equitable treatment does not 
necessarily mean identical treatment. Different cred-
itors may acquire debt instruments with different 
characteristics associated with different risk exposure. 
There may be justifications for treating different credi-
tors differently — for instance, it could be justifiable to 
give seniority status to creditors that lend into arrears, 
helping the distressed debtor to continue the provision 
of essential services or to run countercyclical macroeco-
nomic policies at the time they are most needed.
Sovereign Immunity
The principle of sovereign immunity is one of the most 
critical principles: it implies that the validity of any sover-
eign debt contract is constrained by the principle of inter-
national law that no country can renounce its sovereign 
immunity, just as no person can sell himself into slavery. 
This principle also sets a limit to the extent to which one 
democratic government can bind its successors. The 
19. NML Capital paid prices that were as low as 10 per cent of the face 
value for some of the bonds. For instance, the price in secondary markets 
of the series »Global Bonds, U.S. dollar 11.375 % due 2017«on Decem-
ber 5, 2008, when NML bought bonds of that series, was 10 cents on the 
dollar; it was 11 cents on the dollar for the purchases of the same series 
made on January 2, 2009; 10.5 cents on the dollar for purchases of the 
series »Global Bonds, U.S. dollar 12.25 % due 2018« made on December 
10, 2008; 17.5 cents on the dollar for purchases of the same series made 
on November 5 and 11 of the same year. See Guzman (2016b) for an 
extensive description of the case.
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principle does not rule out the possibility of issuing debt 
under foreign law, but it places limits on the reach of 
foreign law, reaffirming the limitations of foreign jurisdic-
tions in sovereign debt restructuring processes.
Legitimacy
There are many aspects of the legitimacy of a debt re-
structuring — it obviously requires impartiality on the 
part of any party serving as mediator / arbitrator and it 
requires transparency. Indeed, any restructuring that vio-
lates any of the other principles could arguably be viewed 
as lacking legitimacy. But there are other elements: A 
debt restructuring conducted under force of arms would 
lack legitimacy, but so too would one conducted under 
the threat of economic sanctions, as in the case of Judge 
Griesa’s ruling that effectively precluded Argentina from 
accessing international credit markets. Thus, Argentina’s 
2016 debt restructuring arguably lacks legitimacy on 
these grounds. Any debt restructuring that resulted in 
the country violating its constitution or the UN Declara-
tion of Human Rights would also lack legitimacy.20
Sustainability
Restoring sustainability is the primary goal of a sover-
eign debt restructuring process. The enunciation of the 
UN sustainability principle recognizes that the relevant 
stakeholders in a restructuring process are not only the 
formal, but also the informal creditors (those that do 
not have formal debt contracts with the sovereign, but 
towards whom the sovereign has obligations, such as 
pensioners and workers). The restoration of sustainabil-
ity must not only balance fairly the rights of foreign and 
formal creditors but also those of other claimants, and 
promote sustained and inclusive development. Standard 
approaches, such as that followed by the IMF, have gen-
erally ignored this broader perspective, as attention has 
been focused mostly on formal financial claimants.21
20. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) Guide recommends that any insolvency law »require(s) the disclo-
sure of a conflict of interest, a lack of independence or circumstances 
that may lead to a conflict of interest or lack of independence« and also 
that this obligation »continue throughout the insolvency proceedings.« 
(UNCITRAL Guide, Recommendations 116 and 117). 
21. See Bohoslavsky and Goldmann (2016) for a more extensive discus-
sion. Note that Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code, pertaining to the 
bankruptcy of public authorities, does make many of these distinctions. 
See, e. g. Stiglitz (2010).
Majority Restructuring
Finally, the principle of majority restructuring will help 
to impede holdout strategies such as the ones success-
fully pursued by vulture funds. There has been progress 
over the last two years in the elaboration and adoption 
of contractual language for more robust debt instru-
ments (see ICMA, 2014; Gelpern, Heller, and Setser, 
2016; Gelpern, 2016). Although the principle of majority 
restructuring per se will not rectify all of the deficien-
cies we observe in sovereign debt restructuring, and al-
though there are ambiguities in aggregating across cred-
itor classes, as we have noted earlier, it is a necessary 
complement to the other principles.
One country, Argentina, has already adopted the prin-
ciples. Bolivia’s lower house has also passed them. A 
few months after Argentina adopted them, the coun-
try reached a deal with vulture funds and other hold-
out bondholders that implied the already described in-
equitable treatment of creditors. Had the country not 
reached a deal, it would have been impeded from ac-
cessing international credit markets. Given its desire to 
return to international capital markets and the ruling by 
the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, the country had no choice but to ignore one or 
more of the UN principles. In the current international 
financial landscape — where countries issue debt under 
foreign jurisdictions and the domestic legislation of the 
jurisdictions in question does not adopt the UN princi-
ples, and where the judiciaries in some of these coun-
tries do not respect these principles — it is likely that 
one or more of the principles will be violated in future 
sovereign debt restructurings. Governments should bear 
this in mind when borrowing in such jurisdictions.22
The adoption of the UN principles contributes to a pos-
itive norm setting process. Even if domestic legislations 
do not adopt them, local courts might follow them as 
guidance when they interpret and apply the law in ref-
erence to disputes related to sovereign debt. Such legis-
lation is also desirable because general principles of law 
are sources of international law. States need to comply 
with them as a matter of international law — or at least 
22. However, political economy concerns mean that such borrowing is 
likely to continue, if countries can get access to credit in such markets 
on more favorable terms than they could elsewhere: it is in the interests 
of both short-sighted creditors and politicians to focus on the short-
run benefits, ignoring these long-run costs. See Guzman and Stiglitz 
(2016a). 
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they should do so (Goldmann, 2016). There is still a long 
road ahead in the process of norm setting, and there are 
possible reforms based on the UN principles that could 
allow countries to use them as an effective tool. The 
next section discusses a possible way forward.
3. The Road Ahead
The proposals for sovereign debt restructuring should 
be evaluated in terms of their ability to ensure the re-
covery of debt sustainability and whether they respect 
the UN principles. The contractual approach will not, 
we believe, fully address this concern satisfactorily.23 
The statutory approach could do so, but it seems to be 
politically unfeasible at the current juncture. This is an 
unfortunate situation, especially considering that the 
current state of the global economy puts several coun-
tries at risk of debt unsustainability in the short term.24 
The natural question is what can be done to improve 
matters soon.
Our proposal for the immediate next steps is to continue 
efforts to establish a soft law regime — an incremental 
approach that builds on the UN principles and can be 
complemented by contractual improvements. Soft law 
has the potential to create a healthier environment for 
debtors and creditors. It relies on social norms and mar-
ket acceptance, rather than on legal forces, to induce 
compliance. This incremental approach inspired the 
2015 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) Roadmap and Guide, and was followed by the UN 
GA in the resolution that adopted the UN principles. It 
enjoys the support of many academics (see bibliogra-
phy section) and also of UNCTAD, which, although it 
recognizes that a multinational legal framework remains 
the only truly effective and fair solution, fully supports 
the continuation of efforts to build a soft law regime 
and regards it as the most constructive and sustainable 
approach under the current circumstances (see Blanken-
burg and Kozul-Wright, 2016).
23. The key point is that under the contractual approach, there is still 
scope for a judge not well versed in principles of international law and 
the economics of sovereign debt restructuring to adopt inappropriate 
interpretations of key terms in the debt contract — as Judge Griesa made 
so abundantly clear. Although there is no way to prevent similar rulings 
within the statutory approach, the fact that the judges in such cases 
would presumably be familiar at least with the issues of international 
sovereign debt restructurings would make such rulings less likely. The soft 
law approach described below provides, in effect, further safeguards.
24. See Reinhart (2016).
A soft law instrument that codifies the UN principles 
for practical purposes could serve as a guide for do-
mestic legislation. The codification of the principles 
might remind courts of the big picture in a sovereign 
debt restructuring process, possibly mitigating biases to-
wards narrower interpretations of debt contracts. The 
institution hosting the soft law regime could maintain 
a registry of recalcitrant holdout bondholders and their 
parent companies. The registry could serve as a guide 
for domestic and international courts when they have 
to decide whether bondholders violated the principle of 
good faith. It could also host a comprehensive, search-
able public database of past restructurings, including 
financial and legal terms, the treatment of public, pri-
vate, domestic and foreign claims, and any underlying 
assumptions used for achieving a restructuring plan.
The institution could create its own debt sustainabil-
ity analysis (DSA) framework, stating general princi-
ples for debt sustainability assessments (respecting the 
UN GA enunciation of the sustainability principle). It 
would encourage cooperation among the stakehold-
ers involved in order to achieve a level of relief that 
respects their sustainability assessments and satisfies 
the other UN principles. In a process of sovereign debt 
restructuring initiated by the sovereign, the competent 
institution would first produce a preliminary DSA and 
transmit it to the government for a response. The gov-
ernment would be required to disclose information and 
data necessary for the assessment and to respond to 
the DSA. The preliminary DSA and the government’s 
response would next be made public to the creditors, 
other international institutions, and the general pub-
lic, all of whom would have an opportunity for com-
ment. After a reasonable time period, the institution 
would publish a final DSA taking into account the 
government’s response and public comment. The final 
DSA would give reasons that justify the determination 
made and would indicate possible disagreement with 
the government, international institutions, or creditors’ 
committees.
The statements of the institution would not be enforce-
able, but could be used as a legitimate guide for the 
stakeholders involved (especially for domestic courts) on 
what is sensible practice in a process of debt restruc-
turing. We believe that these reforms can mitigate the 
deficiencies that are currently leading to inefficient and 
inequitable restructuring outcomes.
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1.  A sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to design its macroeco-
nomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt, which should not be frustrated 
or impeded by any abusive measures. Restructuring should be done as the last resort, 
preserving at the outset creditors’ rights.1
2.  Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engage-
ment in constructive sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations and other stages 
of the process with the aim of a prompt and durable re-establishment of debt sustain-
ability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the support of a critical mass of creditors 
through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms.
3.  Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors 
concerned, which can be achieved through the timely sharing of both data and processes 
related to sovereign debt workouts.
4.  Impartiality requires that all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt restructur-
ing workouts, including at the regional level, in accordance with their respective man-
dates, enjoy independence and refrain from exercising any undue influence over the pro-
cess and other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would give rise to conflicts of 
interest or corruption, or both.
5.  Equitable treatment imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating 
among creditors, unless a different treatment is justified under the law, is reasonable 
and is correlated to the characteristics of the credit, guaranteeing intercreditor equality, 
discussed among all creditors. Creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate 
treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor 
groups should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process.
6.  Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt restructur-
ings is a right of States before foreign domestic courts and exceptions should be restric-
tively interpreted.
7.  Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to 
sovereign debt restructuring workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the rule 
of law, at all levels. The terms and conditions of the original contracts should remain valid 
until such time as they are modified by a restructuring agreement.
8.  Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a time-
ly and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving 
at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth 
and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, guaranteeing the 
stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights.
9.  Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are ap-
proved by a qualified majority of the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopard-
ized or otherwise impeded by other States or a non-representative minority of creditors, 
who must respect the decisions adopted by the majority of the creditors. States should 
be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued.
25. Cf. Chairperson Summary, United Nations Ad hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, Third 
working session, 24 July of 2015; available at: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/gds_sd_2015-07-27-
28_report_en.pdf (last accessed on 22 September 2016). 
Appendix: The UN Principles25
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Notes on the Literature
The recent intensification of the debate on reforms for sovereign debt restructuring is gen-
erating a large number of research articles. The different chapters in Guzman, Ocampo, and 
Stiglitz, eds. (2016) offer an overview of the major problems, a description of recent reforms in 
the contractual approach, and a variety of proposals regarding the constitution of a statutory 
approach, as well as discussion on how to pursue the incremental approach. Further analysis 
is offered by Brooks et al. (2015) and Stiglitz et al. (2015). The Volume 41, Issue 2 of 2016 of 
the Yale Journal of International Law includes articles that analyze different central aspects 
of the incremental approach. The papers in the issue offer a more extensive analysis of the 
meanings and reach of each of the UN principles. The Volume 6, Issue 2 of December 2015 
of the Journal of Globalization and Development includes a series of papers on current issues 
of sovereign debt restructuring. The series includes papers that improve the understanding of 
the characteristics of decentralized negotiations in restructuring processes, the working of the 
IMF debt sustainability analysis framework, risk management approaches for assessing debt 
sustainability, the role of international investment agreements for sovereign debt restructur-
ing, the process that led to the adoption of the UN principles, as well as different institutional 
approaches for moving in the direction of creating a statutory regime. Stiglitz (2010) offers an 
analysis of theoretical issues regarding debt crises resolution. (See also other chapters in Her-
man, Ocampo, and Spiegel, eds., 2010). Various chapters in Stiglitz and Heymann, eds. (2014) 
also address key theoretical and practical issues in sovereign debt crises resolution.
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